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Abstract—Research on vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs)
is active and ongoing. Proposed applications range from safety
applications, and traffic efficiency applications to entertainment
applications. Common to many applications is the need to
disseminate possibly privacy-sensitive information, such as lo-
cation and speed information, over larger distances. In-network
aggregation is a promising technology that can help to make
such privacy-sensitive information only available in the direct
vicinity of vehicles instead of communicating it over larger areas.
Further away, only aggregated information that is not privacy-
relevant anymore will be known. At the same time, aggregation
mechanisms help to cope with the limited available wireless
bandwidth. However, the exact privacy properties of aggregation
mechanisms have still not been thoroughly researched. In this
paper, we propose a metric to measure privacy enhancements
provided by in-network aggregation and use it to compare
existing schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are an active field
of current research, evolving around the idea of using ded-
icated short range communication (DSRC) to enable direct
ad hoc communication between vehicles to exchange mes-
sages, thereby enhancing traffic safety, driving efficiency, and
providing entertainment services to the drivers. Aspects of
VANET research are vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication
and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication. Currently,
many research projects and field operational trials prepare the
deployment of VANET technology in Europe (e.g., CVIS,
DRIVE C2X, simTD), the USA (e.g., VSC), and Japan (e.g.,
SKY). Infrastructure components, such as road side units
placed on the streets in regular intervals, can enhance the
penetration rate and connectedness of the network, but their
high deployment cost might prove to be inhibitive. Therefore,
we will focus on V2V communication in the following. Char-
acteristic for V2V communication are a high node mobility
and the fact that all vehicles are both information producers
and information consumers. For some applications, this means
broadcasting messages to all neighbors in direct communica-
tion range, but for other applications this means distributing
messages over larger areas using multi hop dissemination
protocols. Efficiency applications, such as traffic information
systems, in particular profit from large range message dis-
semination. Similarly, applications that collect hazardous road
conditions or provide parking spot availability information
need a knowledge base spanning larger regions. Especially
for those applications in need of long range message dissem-
ination, preservation of user privacy will be one of the key
Fig. 1. Multi-hop data dissemination without aggregation.
Fig. 2. Concept of in-network data aggregation.
problems to solve for successful deployment. For almost any
VANET application, rich and precise data containing locations,
times, and other information, e.g., speed, heading, or planned
destination of cars, is necessary. If such data is communicated
over larger areas and adversaries are able to collect it, they
can build detailed databases containing the exact whereabouts
of individuals.
One efficient way to achieve privacy preservation while,
at the same time, helping scalability is in-network data ag-
gregation. Here, nodes do not disseminate individual atomic
information throughout the network, but instead aggregate
information and only disseminate this aggregated information
further. Consider an application for the dissemination of traffic
jam information. Without aggregation, each vehicle would
need to broadcast its speed and position information pi to
neighboring vehicles, which would in turn disseminate them
further to help approaching vehicles avoid traffic jams; see
Figure 1. This communication pattern would quickly overload
the wireless medium and infringe user privacy. All vehicles
send out and re-broadcast permanently, disseminating exact in-
formation in large regions. Thus, by capturing such messages,
adversaries can build large databases with exact location traces
with few physical vehicles or road side equipment.
With aggregation, atomic messages containing exact in-
formation are only disseminated via single hop broadcast.
Receiving vehicles will combine the messages with their own
information, resulting in a message that contains traffic infor-
mation about a road interval instead of a single location; see
Figure 2. Besides the aforementioned traffic jam application,
there are many more examples of applications that can profit
from in-network aggregation algorithms without sacrificing
service quality. Using in-network aggregation inherently aids
privacy, because exact information about vehicles is only
available in the close vicinity of a vehicle. Only aggregated
information, which cannot be used to identify single vehicles,
is disseminated over larger areas, thereby achieving a certain
anonymity level for the users. However, a clear analysis of
the privacy properties provided by aggregation mechanisms is
necessary. We propose to extend the notion of a user being
anonymous inside a certain group of data sets, known as k-
anonymity in the database research domain, to express the
anonymity depending on the distance of the observer to the ob-
served vehicle. Our contribution in this paper is the definition
of a new privacy metric suitable for in-network aggregation,
as well as a first approach on describing a best case for user
privacy achievable by aggregation mechanisms in relation to
privacy achieved by existing aggregation mechanisms found
in the literature.
In the following, we will briefly introduce existing data
aggregation schemes in Section II before introducing a new
metric for the privacy provided by in-network aggregation in
Section III. Afterwards, in Section IV, we apply our metric
to existing aggregation schemes. Finally, we conclude with an
outlook on open research challenges in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In-network data aggregation for VANETs is a field that is
thoroughly researched. First papers proposed to use a fixed-
size segmentation of the road as underlying structure for
aggregation decisions. Wischhof et al. introduced the SOTIS
traffic information system [1]. The proposed protocol uses pe-
riodic beaconing for exchange of traffic information. Received
traffic data is aggregated based on road segmentation. For each
segment, the average speed is calculated and later forwarded.
Another class of existing schemes is those that use syntactic
compression of data. Unlike semantic compression, such as
done by SOTIS by averaging data, syntactic compression is
fully reversible. Ibrahim and Weigle [2] present a cluster
based aggregation scheme suitable for dissemination of traffic
information. At local scope in front of a given vehicle, single
reports are disseminated and collected using geo-broadcast.
This local view is then clustered using fixed size segments
and differential coding is used to compress vehicle information
in each cluster. The compressed information is then dissemi-
nated further. In [3], the CASCADE system is enhanced with
security-, especially integrity-related, features.
A more advanced aggregation scheme is applied in newer
aggregation schemes. Instead of relying on a fixed structure
of roads, they make aggregation decisions based on the cur-
rent homogeneity of the traffic. The TrafficView system [4]
disseminates information about the average speed of vehicles
on the road. In contrast to SOTIS, TrafficView is node-centric,
not space-centric. That is, reports of nodes which are close to
each other are aggregated by averaging their current speed and
position. However, to be able to further identify the nodes,
a list of all involved nodes is kept with the aggregate. The
aim of this approach is to get an estimated view on the
set of surrounding vehicles. To decide the granularity of the
aggregation, two algorithms are proposed: a ratio-based and a
cost-based. The authors of TrafficView evaluate their system
using different metrics that judge the knowledge of a vehicle
about its surrounding road network as well as the accuracy of
the aggregation.
Lochert et al. [5] take a hierarchical approach on aggre-
gating free parking slots using globally known map data
for segmentation. One major advantage of their system is
the usage of an adapted version of Flajolet-Martin sketches
to achieve a probabilistic but duplicate insensitive sum of
free parking spaces. Aggregates can therefore be arbitrarily
combined and re-combined without counting free parking slots
multiple times.
Dietzel et al. [6] describe an aggregation scheme that
focuses on flexible decision metrics. Fuzzy logic rules are
employed to base aggregation decisions on qualitative metrics,
such as induced quality loss due to aggregation. The resulting
scheme aggregates data more where the road network state is
homogenous, yet allots more bandwidth to stretches with high
state entropy.
Scheuermann et al. [7] provide a theoretical scalability
bound for aggregation protocols in VANETs. The main result
is that the data rate must be reduced asymptotically faster than
the squared distance to the information source (i.e., O(1/d2))
to be able to scale to larger deployments. Also, the authors
provide a construction framework for a mechanism achieving
the claimed rate.
Privacy aspects of VANET aggregation have been men-
tioned by Sampigethaya et al. [8], however they restrict them-
selves to syntactic aggregation. In a later paper, Sampigeth-
aya et al. [9] introduce aggregation of location data inside
groups of vehicles for enhancing privacy when using location
based services. However, their approach is targeted towards
infrastructure-supported (i.e., V2I) communication. For se-
mantic in-network aggregation, there are currently no thorough
assessments of privacy implications.
III. METRICS
Intuitively, in-network aggregation is privacy friendly in the
sense that no exact information about single vehicles is com-
municated to areas further away. Instead, exact information
items of several vehicles are combined and only aggregated
information, such as averages, is communicated. This step is
necessary and essential for aggregation to cope with bandwidth
limitations of the wireless medium. However, beyond this
intuitive notion, the exact gain in privacy due to aggregation
has not been formulated so far. Therefore, we will introduce a
new metric, which we call k-anonymity over distance. The k-
anonymity metric has been introduced in the database research
domain by Sweeney [10]. k-anonymity is a simple metric that
can be used to express the indistinguishability of personal
information stored in databases. Instead of only basing the k-
anonymity on information that directly identifies individuals,
Sweeney uses the notion of quasi-identifiers first introduced by
Dalenius [11]. Quasi identifiers are tuples of information that
suffice to identify individuals. For instance, a combination of
birth place, birth date, and full name will uniquely identify a
person. Given a table T (a1, . . . , an) with attributes a1, . . . , an,
and a subset of attributes sufficing to identify individuals that
table rows originate from QI T , T (a1, . . . , an) is said to satisfy
k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of values in the
projection of T to only the quasi identifier attributes T [QI T ]
appears with at least k occurrences.
Given a static, centralistic database, k-anonymity can be
decided. However, in a vehicular network, information changes
over time and different subsets of the total knowledge are
known at different points in the network. Moreover, vehicles
travel through the network, physically transporting knowledge
from one part of the network to another. Assuming that
new exact information is constantly generated by vehicles,
we can neglect time in our considerations. At each point in
time, new and unaggregated information will be broadcast
by vehicles in their one-hop neighborhood and, at the same
time, more aggregated information about each vehicle travels
through the network. Moreover, old information expires after
a certain amount of time and is not disseminated further by
aggregation schemes. Therefore, we can assume the amount
of information with different privacy sensitivity properties to
be constant throughout time. However, it varies depending on
the distance to the originating vehicle. Also, we will neglect
vehicle mobility in our considerations. Even with high relative
vehicle speeds on motorways (e.g., 150 km/h in opposite
directions), the speed of information dissemination by physical
transport is negligible in comparison to the possible wireless
transmission dissemination speed.
Therefore, we propose to use k-anonymity over distance
as a suitable metric for measuring the privacy aspects of in-
network aggregation, adopting the database-centric definition
of k-anonymity in the following way. Let V be the particular
vehicle that we want to analyze the privacy of. Let SV :=
{s1V , . . . , snV} be a set of sensor values read from a car’s
in-vehicle sensors and that are potentially privacy sensitive,
e.g., currently driven speed, location, and time. If another
vehicle receives this exact information or can reconstruct it
uniquely, k-anonymity is 1. However, other vehicles receiving
SV will aggregate the values with their own sensor values Si
by applying an aggregation function: Y = f(SV , S1, . . . , Sn).
After aggregation, we say that the resulting value Y provides
k-anonymity if at least k sensor tuples from other vehicles
were used in the calculation and if f is not invertible, even
given partial knowledge about the input values. Such partial
knowledge is very common in aggregation schemes. For
instance, vehicles have exact information available for all
other cars in their one-hop neighborhood. Now suppose, a
vehicle v receives an aggregated value from another vehicle w,
which is at the far end of v’s wireless reception range. Now
v nows the exact input values for some of the information
that w used for aggregation, but not for all of them. This
partial information can be used by v to reconstruct the other,
unknown, input values if the aggregation function is invert-
ible. More formally, assume that a receiver knows a subset
X ⊂ S := {SV , S1, . . . , Sn} in addition to Y . Then it should
hold that
∀X ⊂ S : I (X; (S −X) ∪ Y ) ≈ 0 (1)
where I is the mutual information. Note that the average
function, for instance, does not meet this requirement. Given
Y = f(x1, . . . , xn) :=
x1 + · · ·+ xn
n
and knowing x1, . . . , xn−1, and n, xn can be easily calculated:




Even if less values xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} are known, the
unknown values can still be narrowed down to a smaller
range. Similarly when f(x1, . . . , xn) := min(x1, . . . , xn),
then xn is known if x1, . . . , xn−1, Y are known and ∀xi ∈
{x1, . . . , xn−1} : xi > Y . Therefore, great attention needs
to be payed when choosing the aggregation functions for a
particular aggregation scheme.
Further, let N be the average number of vehicles in direct
communication range of each other, i.e., the number of each
vehicle’s 1-hop neighbors and let r be the radius of one
vehicle’s communication range. Now we can calculate the k-
anonymity over distance for a highway scenario in the best
case for privacy. We will use three more assumptions besides
the aforementioned requirement on the aggregation function
used. First, we assume that maximum aggregation is used in
the sense that, given two items, the protocol always chooses
to aggregate these two items and only the most aggregated
items are disseminated further. Note that this will not be
the case in real schemes, because quality requirements of
applications dictate the granularity of aggregation decisions,
together with bandwidth requirements. Second, we assume
that all vehicles, including possible attackers, behave accord-
ing to the aggregation protocol and only protocol-compliant
information is communicated. In the case of maximum ag-
gregation, this means that only the aggregated information
and no additional, more detailed information is communicated.
Third, we assume that the aggregation scheme in question uses
exact information to bootstrap aggregation, which is then used
to build more aggregated information during dissemination.
This means that a scheme starts with exact sensor readings
of particular vehicles instead of directly sending out already
coarsened or aggregated information. Most of the aggregation
schemes currently proposed in literature follow this blueprint.
Figure 3 shows the calculation of the best possible k-
anonymity over distance. After one beacon interval bi, each
vehicle has sent out its own sensor tuple. It is received
by all N vehicles within the communication radius r. For
the next beacon, all vehicles on the road know the sensor
tuples of all their N neighbors. Because of the maximum
Fig. 3. Best case calculation of k-anonymity.
aggregation assumption, the vehicles at the border of V’s com-
munication range will now broadcast aggregated tuples of the
form f(SV , S1, . . . , SN−1) with k = N . Again, one beacon
interval further, vehicles will have received another aggregated
information from vehicles not priorly in communication range.
Therefore they disseminate combined aggregates of the form
f(SV , S1, . . . , SN−1, SN , . . . , S2N−1), having k = 2N .
Note that we only look at those communication paths that
have the lowest hop count from V to a given receiving vehicle.
That is, those communication paths that are established by
nodes at the border of the wireless reception range, as denoted
by the highlighted nodes in Figure 3. At the same time,
communication paths with a larger hop count can exist, but
they necessarily result in higher values for kd due to the
maximum aggregation assumption.
Therefore the k-anonymity over distance in the best case is
kmaxd = max(1, bd/rc · N ), (2)
where d is the distance between the observer and V in meters,
independent of the specific aggregation scheme used.
IV. EXAMPLES
The presented bound describes the maximum possible level
of k-anonymity over distance. However, existing aggregation
schemes do not necessarily reach this level of k-anonymity. We
will discuss the k-anonymity over distance of selected existing
mechanisms in the following.
The SOTIS aggregation protocol [1] was one of the first
in-network aggregation mechanisms proposed for VANETs. It
uses a fixed size road segmentation as aggregation structure.
Figure 4 shows the level of privacy achieved. Vehicles con-
tinuously send out sensor tuples containing exact information
to their one-hop neighborhood. Therefore kd is 1 for d ≤ r.
For the two-hop neighbors, i.e., r ≤ d ≤ 2r, kd is N , because
SOTIS only disseminates aggregated information to further
away nodes. For d > 2r, kd rises again to 2N in Figure 4,
because we assume a segment size of 2r. Afterwards, kd
stays constant, because SOTIS does not perform hierarchical
aggregation on already aggregated information. Therefore, the
SOTIS system in general achieves
kd = min(bd/rc · N , s/r · N ) kmaxd (3)
Fig. 4. Comparison of the SOTIS scheme with the best case with r = 250m,
N = 25, and an aggregation segment size of 500 m.
for a segment size of s. Note that this calculation still assumes
equation 1 to hold, which is not the case for the average
function used by SOTIS, as argued in Section III.
The CASCADE approach [2] is fundamentally different
from SOTIS. Instead of averaging values, all information is
aggregated in a lossless fashion. Therefore, any receiver can
calculate the exact sensor tuples of each vehicle given the
output of the aggregation function. Moreover, CASCADE
chooses to disseminate exact sensor information of vehicles in
a 1.5 km radius without performing any aggregation. However,
information is only disseminated further in the direction of
traffic flow. Therefore, the CASCADE system achieves
kd =
{
1, d ≥ −1500m
∞, otherwise  k
max
d (4)
where ∞ denotes that no information about V is available
in particular regions due to decisions of the aggregation
scheme rather than due to limitations of the communication
channel. The authors of CASCADE published a follow-up
paper addressing security, mainly integrity, but not enhancing
privacy properties [3].
TrafficView [4], as well as a Fuzzy-Logic-based aggrega-
tion scheme proposed by Dietzel et al. [6] represent a third
category of aggregation schemes. Unlike the two previously
discussed aggregation schemes, these do not rely on a fixed
segmentation structure, but instead dynamically aggregate
information according to quality-related parameters, such as
the error induced by averaging information. Therefore, kd
cannot be determined during design time of the system, but
can only be measured during runtime. Because both systems
will aggregate information of vehicles with similar properties,
e.g., similar speed, they will approximate the optimal kd in
homogenous traffic situations such as a traffic jam or free flow-
ing traffic on a road. However, in less homogenous situations
or when particular vehicles stand out, the k-anonymity over
distance for these particular vehicles will be low. This could
mean, for instance, that information about a vehicle speeding
on a road where all other vehicles adhere to a substantially
lower speed limit could be easily identified. While, from an
application point of view, especially this information, which
is deviating form the norm, is often important, it can have
bad results for the privacy of affected drivers. One possible
countermeasure for this problem is to dynamically monitor
kd values during runtime and artificially coarsen information
from vehicles if necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extend the well known k-anonymity metric
to k-anonymity over distance, making it suitable for gauging
the privacy qualities of in-network aggregation mechanisms
for VANETs. We argued that the achievable privacy, obviously,
relates to the node density and also to the wireless transmission
range. The latter means that, no matter how much informa-
tion is aggregated within a particular i-hop neighborhood of
a vehicle, all vehicles within the same transmission range
will always have access to the least aggregated information
available to them. In particular, this means for the 1-hop, i.e.,
direct, neighborhood of a car that all vehicles in transmission
range will have access to exact and unaggregated information
of that car. Despite being necessary for bootstrapping the
aggregation and further information dissemination process, it
can be argued that this information is likely necessary for
supporting fundamental services of a VANET, as well. For
instance, beaconing, that is, periodic one-hop broadcasting of
position, time, and other status information, is a vital service
that many more advanced VANET applications build upon.
This beaconing service provides the same possibly privacy
sensitive information that is used to bootstrap many aggre-
gation protocols. It is therefore fair to assume that the privacy
trade-offs imposed by exact information being available in the
direct vicinity have to be accepted. However, capturing this
information requires a high physical effort by using cars to
physically follow a target vehicle or a high criminal effort
by trying to gain control over a sufficiently high percentage
of cars on the road to gain access to their locally stored
information. Therefore, availability of exact information in the
close vicinity is likely acceptable.
However, the further information moves away from a target
vehicle, the harder it is to identify information of a single
vehicle anymore, given that suitable aggregation schemes are
used. In the best case, k-anonymity over distance grows
linearly with increasing distance, though not all existing
schemes reach this best case. Non-hierarchical schemes, as
well as schemes that only compress syntactically fail for
obvious reasons. However, even more recent schemes show
problematic properties. Because of their dynamic nature, no
hard guarantees on k-anonymity over distance can be made at
deployment time. To overcome this problem, two strategies
are possible: runtime measurement of kd, including proper
measures to artificially enhance it if necessary, or moving away
from schemes that bootstrap with exact information.
If kd is to be measured during runtime, a remote trust
establishment between vehicles is necessary. Before exact
information is sent out, a protocol needs to ensure that
the receiving vehicles will indeed aggregate the information
further and not re-broadcast the exact information. Such a
remote trust establishment process is difficult due to the fact
that all information is broadcasted and receivers are not known
beforehand due to the high mobility of nodes. Similarly,
achieving aggregation without using exact information to boot-
strap the process is difficult, because no collaborative, multi-
round protocols are possible due to high vehicle mobility.
Moreover, the specific privacy properties of aggregation
functions need to be assessed in future work. As we have
argued, the commonly used average function does not provide
the privacy-preserving properties that are necessary. The main
problem here is that nodes do not only possess the final result
of aggregation functions, but, due to the dynamic nature of
in-network aggregation protocols, almost always also know
partial exact values that were used in the calculation.
We have taken a first step from the intuitive privacy notion
of in-network aggregation towards a formal model for describ-
ing, measuring, enforcing, and enhancing privacy properties.
Examples show that existing schemes are promising, but far
from reaching optimal characteristics. As next steps, we plan
to develop our metric further, incorporating more advanced
privacy measures, as well as to work on theoretic bounds
of privacy-preservation and using the gained knowledge to
enhance existing schemes.
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